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Chapter 4 – The broadcasting revolution 
and performing rights 
 
Revenue collection  
In the years between the world wars, neither Britain nor Australia made 
significant changes to copyright legislation. Yet the period is 
characterised by tumult and commotion. The creature given life by the 
legislation of 1911 and 1912 begins to flex its limbs and move among 
mortals startled and sometimes outraged by its peremptory demands 
for recognition and obedience.  
One theme dominated copyright discourse – the demand by 
performing right societies, and later record companies, for the payment 
of public performance royalties. By 1940, commercial users of music 
grudgingly acknowledged the right of copyright owners to receive 
payment for the public performance of music, and the consensus 
pointed to a subtle yet radical transformation in perceptions about the 
function of copyright law.  
Henceforward, policymakers accepted a legislative principle never 
acknowledged by the originators of the British and Australian 
Copyright Acts. They determined that the legislation could function as 
an instrument to regulate the sweeping transfer of income from users 
of copyright material to controllers of that material. Copyright owners 
could, if they wished, permit collecting societies to bargain with users 
on their behalf. The revenue collecting system inaugurated between the 
wars proved hugely lucrative, although critics detected in its operations 
the malodour of rent-seeking. 
In 1914, holders of the performing right in Britain, led by the larger 
music publishing houses, seized the opportunity offered to them by 
widespread use of gramophones to play music in public leisure and 
entertainment venues. Inspired by example of France and Germany,1 
they established a collecting society, the Performing Right Society, to 
                                                     
1 Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique established France 
1851, and Gesellschaft für Musikalische Aufführungs established in the early years 
of the 20th century. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 
began operations in 1914. 
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collect royalty payments from the public users of musical works – 
orchestras, opera companies, music halls and, more lucratively, the 
thousands of venues playing gramophone records in public. 
The PRS responded rapidly to the onset of mass radio broadcasting. In 
the early 1920s, after the formation of the British Broadcasting 
Company, it began demanding performance fees for the broadcasting 
of music. British music publishers were alert to commercial possibilities 
overseas, and through their subsidiaries and affiliates in Australia, 
arranged for the formation of a sister society in Australia – the 
Australasian Performing Right Society.  
APRA, formed in 1926, shifted official thinking in Australia about the 
function of copyright law. Its insistence on payment for the public 
performance of music, its doggedness and its stridency, led to the Royal 
Commission on Performing Rights in 1933 and the spread of the axiom 
that the person who uses copyright material must pay for that use.  
The metamorphosis of copyright legislation into the medium 
facilitating the collective transfer of income from users to owners 
depended on other developments that could hardly be predicted  
when Parliament enacted the legislation: the growth of radio 
broadcasting, the spread of mass entertainment, and the playing of 
music to radio audiences. 
The radio broadcasting revolution began after the First World War, 
transforming society and bringing riches within the reach of certain 
classes of copyright owner. Wireless broadcasting created huge demand 
for public performance of music and songs, and also stunning new 
possibilities for the remuneration of owners of musical copyright. In 
Britain, the PRS seized its chance and demanded copyright payments 
from the new British Broadcasting Company.  
The founders of the PRS, principally music publishers, were motivated 
by antagonism for the recording industry and alarm at the continuing 
decline in sheet music sales. They hoped to collect public performance 
fees for live entertainments or the playing of music on gramophones. 
None guessed that innovations in wireless telegraphy would shortly 
create the radio industry and a rich source of future revenue. APRA 
carried in Australia the torch lit in Britain by the PRS, a shareholder 
and guiding influence in the Australian company.  
Australian copyright regulation in the interwar years is the story of 
businessmen and politicians working out how to most efficiently 
 
114 
regulate the musical performing right and how to respond to the record 
industry’s claim for a mechanical performing right. At a deeper level, it 
reflects a seismic shift in official thinking about how the copyright law 
ought to work in practice. That shift could not have occurred without 
the advent of radio and the various commercial and public interests it 
brought into play. To understand how those interests intersected, the 
inquirer must consider the history of both the public performance right 
and radio broadcasting in Australia. 
The public performance right  
A legislative throwaway 
In 1833, Britain passed An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Dramatic 
Literary Property. The Act granted of the author of dramatic literary 
property, or the author’s assignee, the sole right to control 
‘representations’ of ‘dramatic pieces’. The 1842 Copyright Act added to 
the copyright holder’s inventory an explicit performance right and 
extended the term of protection for dramatic pieces to the period now 
applying to literary property – life plus seven years or 42 years from  
the date of first publication, whichever period expired last. The 1842 
Act also provided that the protections applicable to dramatic literary 
property, including the new term of protection, now applied to  
‘musical compositions’.  
Under the 1842 Act, the holder of copyright in a dramatic piece or a 
musical composition, enjoyed the “sole Liberty of representing or 
performing, or causing or permitting to be represented or performed, 
any Dramatic Piece or Musical Composition”. For the purposes of 
copyright duration, the Act declared the first performance of a dramatic 
or musical work to be equivalent to the first publication of a book. 
Though the primary focus of publishers – and therefore legislators – 
remained fixed on books, legislation thus accommodated the economic 
interests of playwrights and composers (and, again, the publishers 
standing behind them) from a relatively early stage. 
In the 19th century, the performing right, exercised astutely, could 
deliver a large part of the total economic benefit that accrued to the 
holder of copyright in dramatic or musical works. By the turn of the 
century sales of sheet music – used for domestic performances on the 
piano and other instruments – also generated large revenues, and 
constituted the primary part of most music publishers’ income. But the 
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holder of copyright in popular works could also hope to generate 
similar revenue from payments received for public performances of 
plays, operas or music.  
Income came from individual agreements between copyright owners 
and the entities contracting to perform works. Clever theatrical 
impresarios amassed fortunes in the 19th century but few dramatists or 
musicians grew rich from the pickings: the pecuniary benefits of 
copyright ownership most often flowed to publishers with the 
resources to enforce the performing right through initial demands and 
then commercial negotiation. 
The most interesting aspect of the performing right is that it represents 
the first departure in copyright law from the concept that copyright 
comprises reproductive and distributive rights. The idea that copyright 
law exists primarily to allow the owner to control the production and 
supply of books permeates 19th century legislation and common law. In 
Britain and the Empire, the 1842 Act reigned supreme as the primary 
source of copyright law.2 Literary property took the first place in the 
thinking of legislators and lawyers. 
Dramatic and musical property attracted the same rights, but embodied 
on sheets of paper they were seen as subsidiary products, secondary, by 
a long distance, to books. The performing right can thus be seen as a 
kind of legislative throwaway, an expedient that recognised that the 
economic value of plays, and to a lesser extent musical compositions, 
lay in public performance for the benefit of a paying audience. 
But this throwaway carried with it grand consequences. So far as 
legislators were concerned, copyright really concerned books. Many 
seemed to view the performing right as a latent principle, an ethereal 
proposition given spectral life by the peculiar natures of subsidiary 
categories – dramatic and musical property. Gramophone, and then 
radio, changed everything, and when the conceptual mists cleared, 
surprised onlookers saw that the holders of the performing right 
occupied central places at the copyright banquet.  
                                                     
2 The Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act 1882 discretely codified the rights of the 
owner of musical copyright. The Act provided that to retain the performance right, 
the copyright owner must publish a reservation notice on the title page of every 
published copy of music. The Gorrell Committee, noting the Berne Convention’s 
prohibition of formalities, advocated that the publication requirement be abolished 
and the 1911 Act made no mention of formalities. 
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A quiet revolutionary right 
In the early 20th century the question of the performing right received 
perfunctory treatment. The Gorrell Committee discussed the 
performing right in some detail but only in a single context: it proposed 
abolition of the requirement in the 1882 Copyright (Musical Compositions) 
Act for formal reservation of the right print in copies of music. Before 
the passage of the 1911 Copyright Act, those who stood to gain most 
from the performing right – musical authors and publishers – spent 
little time debating the merits of the performing right. Instead, they 
expended most of their energy arguing with the record manufacturers 
over the proposed compulsory recording licence.  
Musical copyright holders knew that the spread of the gramophone 
through the whole range of public venues – including tea houses and 
restaurants – would enable them to demand performance fees from an 
expanding list of licensees. But at this stage, they were not greatly 
concerned with the knotty question of how to negotiate with, and 
collect from, the aggregate of public users of gramophones. Nor, of 
course, did they perceive the revenue possibilities that became apparent 
with the spread of radio.  
Gramophone and radio soon caused a change of attitude. Public 
performances of music to mass audiences, whether disparate listeners 
to records played publicly, or the aggregated mass of radio  
listeners, created growing demand. Control of the public  
performance right thus delivered an extraordinary windfall. The 
entertainment venues and radio stations that wished to supply the 
demand were forced to negotiate like supplicants with holders of the 
performing right.  
The owners of literary copyright now watched enviously as a cognate 
right, once regarded as trivial in comparison to the right of 
reproduction, created new economies, all the while delivering new 
riches to the upstart lords of copyright – musical composers and 
publishers. The legislators in 1911 still viewed the public performance 
right as one of secondary economic importance. They could not 
foresee the radical effect of the radio revolution, but had they 
understood the income collecting possibilities created by the already 
common public use of gramophones, they would most likely have 
placed curbs on the right.  
But they did not and most of the commercial disputes over the 
performing right in Britain and Australia after World War I were 
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protracted because the holders of the right could wield it oppressively. 
The unqualified nature of the performing right became a recurrent 
theme of copyright disputes in Australia and eventually the Royal 
Commission on Performing Rights recommended in 1933 the creation 
of a tribunal to fairly arbitrate disputes. That proposal, however,  
went unheeded.  
The performing right, brandished so fiercely by the Performing Right 
Society in Britain, and APRA in Australia, nestled unobtrusively in 
section 2 of the 1911 Copyright Act. Section 2 stated that: 
For the purposes of this Act, “copyright” means the sole right to produce or 
reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatsoever, 
to perform, or in the case of a lecture to deliver, the work or any substantial part 
thereof in public … 
The exercise of this quiet revolutionary right, barely noticed when 
Britain and Australia debated copyright bills, soon enough unleashed 
bitter commercial warfare, in Australia especially, and changed the 
copyright landscape in both countries.  
The history of radio broadcasting in Australia to 
the 1930s 
The growth of wireless telegraphy and the onset of radio 
In 1896, Guglielmo Marconi patented the process of wireless 
telegraphy, enabling users to transmit Morse code over the airwaves. 
The new technology promised rapid communication across  
continents and oceans, and opened to Australia new possibilities in 
communication. To meet the challenge, the Commonwealth  
Parliament passed the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1905, authorising the 
Postmaster General’s Department to oversee the development of 
communications infrastructure.  
Before 1915, the Government, together with the local affiliates of 
Telefunken and the Marconi Company, built 19 wireless telegraphy 
stations in the capital cities and strategic locations across the Australian 
coastline. During the First World War, the Royal Australian Navy 
manned the stations, and two more outposts built by the Government. 
The public knew little of wireless communication but technology 
advanced rapidly. Innovators in Europe and the United States 
developed two-way radio communication, or “radio telephony”, first 
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delivered by vacuum tube. The US Marconi Company began work on 
multi-point communication and after the War, the Marconi Company 
inaugurated the modern era of radio broadcasting.  
When the technology of mass radio communication became available 
after the War, radio amateurs proliferated. Australians were especially 
enthusiastic in the uptake and use of the new technology, later 
assembling home-made “crystal” sets in their thousands to either 
communicate by voice or to tune in to commercial or public radio 
broadcasts. In 1914, members of the public knew little of radio. In 
1918, they knew a little more. After 1920, the entire population knew of 
the existence of the new communications phenomenon and most 
listened to records broadcast on radio. 
The copyright implications of the radio revolution are probably more 
far-reaching than any other change effected by technology or politics in 
the history of copyright law. Radio (or wireless) altered the perceptions 
of copyright owners and users in two specific ways. In the first place, it 
alerted owners (initially the holders of music copyright, later record 
companies) to the possibility of claiming payment for any copyright use 
facilitated by a particular technology (in the case of radio, the playing of 
recordings). Secondly, it hardened the resolve of the recording industry, 
the film industry and broadcasters themselves to secure their own 
copyrights to prospect for and protect seams of revenue.  
In Australia, as radio accelerated the transformation of copyright from 
a device of limited economic utility – one that principally benefitted 
publishers – to an instrument for optimising the profits of copyright 
industries, the name of APRA became universally known, and 
sometimes, almost universally reviled. The activities of APRA 
exemplified how the law of copyright, once a tool for controlling 
piracy, became a springboard for the assertion of positive rights that 
delivered revenue, and more revenue, to copyright owners.  
The rise of AWA and developments in radio 
Everything in the Australian wireless communication scene changed 
after the end of World War I, thanks to the emergence of a powerful 
communications company created by Telefunken and Marconi.3 Led by 
a gifted English autodidact, Ernest Fisk, Amalgamated Wireless 
                                                     
3 In 1913, Telefunken and the Marconi Company resolved patent disputes over the 
design of wireless stations, merging the Australasian Wireless Company and the 
Australian Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company to form AWA. 
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Australasia Ltd became the leviathan of the Australian communications 
industry. AWA supplied most of the country’s radio equipment and, 
driven by its Managing Director, aspired to control radio broadcasting 
across the continent. 
At the end of the War, Fisk had cause to hope for a broadcast 
monopoly. AWA could claim that its relationship with the Marconi 
Company provided the key to unlocking the door to national 
broadcasting in Australia. By 1920, the work of Marconi engineers 
made voice broadcasting to multiple receivers possible, inaugurating the 
age of radio. In June 1920, radio amateurs in Britain listened to the 
broadcast of a Nellie Melba concert. In November of the same year, a 
Pittsburgh radio station broadcast the results of the presidential 
election and by the following year, 31 licensed stations were 
broadcasting in the United States.4 
By then, Fisk had several times demonstrated the power of radio 
transmission to an amazed Australian audience. In 1918, he arranged 
for the first spoken radio transmission to Australia (a message from the 
Prime Minister Billy Hughes from the Western Front) and in 1919 the 
first transmission within Australia (the playing of God Save the King 
between AWA’s Sydney office and a nearby building). He astonished 
federal parliamentarians in November 1919 by arranging for a 
gramophone recording of Rule Britannia and a live performance of 
Advance Australia Fair to be broadcast to Parliament House in 
Melbourne from a point 18 kilometres distant. 
Fisk impressed on politicians the value of AWA’s connection with the 
Marconi Company. Only AWA, said Fisk, possessed the expertise and 
capital to build and run new broadcasting stations throughout Australia. 
His company could readily take control of the wireless stations built 
before the War and create a national broadcasting service similar to that 
offered by the British Broadcasting Company, which began exclusive 
broadcasts in November 1922. 
For a short while, it looked as though he would get his way. 
Regulations issued at the end of 1922 established an AWA monopoly 
but a new Government promptly scuppered Fisk’s plans, cancelling  
the exclusive arrangement. Unabashed, he won the Government’s 
assent to a new scheme that capitalised on AWA’s pre-eminence in the 
                                                     
4 In 1922, a New York station broadcast the first radio advertisements, and by 
year’s end, 571 stations, sharing two wavelengths, were broadcasting news, 
entertainment and advertising to the American public. 
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supply of wireless sets. Regulations now required listeners to buy 
receivers pre-tuned to receive those station frequencies for which they 
paid subscriptions.  
Listeners, however, were not prepared to accept restricted access  
and a mere 1400 subscribers bought the sealed sets. When the 
Government realised that thousands of radio amateurs tuned into 
broadcasts on unlicensed home-assembled radio kits and crystal sets, 
the scheme collapsed. 
Fisk decided to surrender. AWA consolidated its role as Australia’s 
primary supplier of radio station transmitters, valves and other 
equipment, but it played no further role in the debate over licensing 
and programming policy. In 1924, the Government embraced mixed 
broadcasting, supporting the introduction of a Commonwealth-backed 
chain of national broadcasters and the award of broadcast licences to 
private metropolitan companies. The Government saw the merit of 
combining British and American practice: in Britain the BBC held the 
sole broadcasting licence while in the United States stations were 
privately owned and supported themselves by advertising. 
The mixed broadcasting system 
Under the mixed scheme, national broadcasters, the “A Class” stations, 
were supported by the licence fees paid by purchasers of radio sets and 
revenue from restricted advertising. The metropolitan “B Class” 
stations received funding from private sources and advertising revenue. 
Government officials intended that A Class stations would provide 
more refined programming, while the B Class stations would compete 
with each other to satisfy the demand for popular entertainment.  
One consideration drove the new policy: the need to efficiently finance 
the spread of stations across the continent to reach listeners scattered 
in all parts of the country. The Nationalist Coalition Government 
proclaimed the slogan “Men, Money, Markets” and wanted no truck 
with policies that placed the burden for spreading radio broadcasting 
entirely on the shoulders of government.  
The Royal Commission on Wireless in 1927 endorsed the mixed policy, 
recognising that it permitted the rapid growth of broadcasting 
throughout Australia. The Commission characterised the policy as one 
of decentralisation and “local control” designed to prevent the growth 
of “powerful vested interests”. Evidence of success came immediately. 
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66,000 listeners’ licences were issued in the scheme’s first year and the 
number more than doubled in 1926.  
For the broadcasters, especially the B Class stations, popularity did not 
mean financial success. No station of either class made a profit. A Class 
stations, supported by licence fees, performed best, playing 
gramophone music and broadcasting short talks, children’s hours and 
news.5 The B Class stations, a number of which were formed for 
proselytising rather than commercial purposes (the Theosophical 
Society founded Radio 2GB and the NSW Trades and Labor Council 
Radio 2KY) fared worse, and for several years relied on private funding 
for survival. 
Growth and difficulties 
Complaints about the seemingly privileged position of the A Class 
stations, the financial position of the broadcasters, and deficient or 
non-existent broadcasting in rural or remote areas, elicited a swift 
Government response. At the beginning of 1927, it appointed a Royal 
Commission to investigate wireless broadcasting in Australia. The 
Commission reported rapidly, finding that “very little change to the 
existing system is advisable at the present time.”  
Much of the discussion in its report concentrated on the future of the 
A Class stations. The Commissioners considered alternative proposals 
for a single company to own and operate all the stations, or for 
government to own the stations (the British government had recently 
assumed control of the British Broadcasting Company, renaming it the 
British Broadcasting Corporation). They rejected these options, 
concluding that concentration of ownership would “deprive the public 
of the benefit of the incentive which the present regulations give to the 
broadcasting stations to maintain an effective and satisfactory service.” 
The Royal Commission recommended that the revenue from listeners’ 
licence fees be pooled and the income distributed in fixed and variable 
amounts. Other recommendations included the re-allocation of wave 
                                                     
5 The Sydney Morning Herald reported in 1929 that 2FC and 2BL, both A Class 
stations, together devoted, on average, 44 per cent of broadcast time to music, 15 
per cent to talks and information, 8 per cent to sporting coverage, 10 per cent to 
educational features and 7 per cent to children’s entertainment. The BBC and the 
National Broadcasting Company of America, by contrast, allocated 62 per cent and 
67 per cent respectively of playtime to music. 
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lengths within existing wave bands, limitation of the number of B Class 
stations in proportion to population concentrations, and restriction of 
A Class station advertising rights.  
The Commission’s conservative approach aimed at making existing 
arrangements work. Alternatives proposed for altering the ownership 
arrangements for A Class stations failed, said the Commission’s report 
“to do justice to the excellent work that the existing broadcasting 
companies have already performed and would deprive them of any 
chance of recouping themselves for their serious losses.”  
Although wireless continued to boom in Australia (between 1927 and 
the beginning of 1933, the number of listeners’ licences rose from over 
233,000 to 419,000) complaints about the variable service offered by 
the A Class stations, and the continued difficulties in relaying programs 
to rural areas, forced a change of policy. The Government decided that 
when the A Class station licences expired in 1929–30, they would be 
offered by tender to a single company that would offer nationwide 
programming. In the meantime, B Class stations created the pattern for 
modern commercial radio broadcasting, offering the public extended 
playlists of the latest recorded popular music interspersed with other 
programming and advertising.  
By the time the Royal Commission on Performing Rights reported in 
1933, 46 commercial stations operated in Australia. Throughout the 
period of growth, margins remained tight for both A and B Class 
stations. In 1929, the A Class station 6WF, backed by the deep pockets 
of Westralian Farmers Ltd, nearly folded, and Government subsidy 
saved Adelaide’s A Class station. The onset of the Great Depression in 
1929 imposed more financial constraints, limiting advertising revenue 
and slowing the uptake of listeners’ licences, yet the commercial radio 
industry continued to grow. 
The 1930s – pressure on the ABC  
The persistent theme of debate over broadcasting industry policy in the 
1930s is that of the effects of economic depression on the capacity of 
radio stations to satisfy public demand and pay APRA for the playing 
of copyright musical works. The necessity for paying licence fees to 
APRA applied to commercial and non-commercial broadcasters alike, 
and the increasing difficulty faced by the private owners of A Class 
stations led to the Commonwealth exerting control over the 12 national 
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stations in 1932 – five years after the Royal Commission on wireless 
argued against government ownership.6 
APRA was fully conscious of the value of the government funding. 
Throughout the 1930s, the non-commercial stations, funded by licence 
fees, were its primary source of revenue. Thus APRA watched the 
Government’s strategy for A Class stations intently. In 1929, the 
Government contracted a private company owned by theatre 
impresario Benjamin Fuller and music publisher Frank Albert, to 
supply all A Class station programming for three years. Within months, 
APRA, the Government and the Australian Broadcasting Company – 
or ABC – viewed the new arrangements with disfavour. The  
contract forbade advertising and the Great Depression saw licence  
fees plummet, disappointing the income expectations of this 
triumvirate of interests.  
Another limitation dampened financial hopes. The Government 
insisted that the ABC7 avoid broadcasting anything “repugnant to good 
taste” and “cultivate a public desire for … subjects which tend to 
elevate the mind.” As the difficulty of reconciling these strictures with 
revenue-generation became obvious, Fuller and Albert grew frustrated, 
and they happily relinquished their contract in June 1932.  
In May 1932, the newly elected United Australia Party passed the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission Act, and the new ABC began 
broadcasting from July, following the model of the BBC. Government 
ownership removed the immediacy of the economic threat posed  
to the ABC by the downturn in licence fees and the new  
arrangement explicitly demarcated the boundaries between public and 
commercial broadcasting. 
                                                     
6 The Sydney Morning Herald anticipated this development in 1929, noting that 
“many radio experts … believe that the Postmaster-General will eventually have to 
agree to the establishment of a broadcasting organisation in Australia similar to that 
of the BBC in Britain.” The Herald editorial observed that, it “is probable that the 
system provided for in the new contract is merely a stepping stone to that fuller 
control by a quasi-official organisation which will probably be brought about in 
time. The system of dual control now adopted offers so many pitfalls for officials, 
as well as the contractor, that probably united control will be welcomed later, as the 
easiest way out of many difficulties.”  
7 Its government owned successor, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, and 
then the retitled Australian Broadcasting Corporation, were also referred to as the 
ABC.  
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APRA maintained unremitting pressure on the ABC in either of its 
guises to pay extensive public performance fees. When the Attorney 
General, John Latham, asked Cabinet in 1932 to authorise a Royal 
Commission to investigate APRA’s activities, he did so because he 
could no longer hold down the lid of a boiling pot. Commercial 
broadcasters pressed hardest for the Royal Commission but Latham 
knew that APRA itself looked to the ABC for the largest part of its 
revenue. APRA would negotiate ruthlessly to extract from the ABC the 
largest amount possible for performance fees. The Royal Commission 
crowned years of anger and dispute over APRA’s demands for payment 
of public performance fees and its report officially endorsed the 
principle of mass revenue collection by copyright collecting societies. 
APRA and the war over the performing right 
Formation of APRA 
APRA came into existence in Sydney on 4 January 1926, registered as a 
company limited by guarantee. Its members each provided a  
guarantee of £10. The Association operated on a non-profit basis, with 
no assets other than business premises, furniture and minor items. Its 
objects, set out in the Memorandum of Association, were to “enter into 
and carry into effect an Agreement between the Performing Right 
Society Limited (England) and the Company”, to “protect and enforce 
the rights of authors composers and publishers of music and literary 
and dramatic works and the owners holders and licensees of copyrights 
and performing rights for such works etc”, and to “exercise and 
enforce of members of the Company … all rights and remedies of the 
proprietors etc.” 
The subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association 
consisted of eight music importers and publishers controlling the sale 
of sheet music in Australia, and the firm of British music publishers, 
Chappell and Co. By 1932, the membership had grown to consist also 
of another two Australian music publishers, three New Zealand music 
publishing companies, and the Performing Right Society Limited 
(England). Affiliates included the PRS and corresponding societies in 
France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and elsewhere.  
Significantly, in light of later controversy, Articles 113 and 114 were 
secrecy provisions requiring directors and employees of APRA to keep 
secret the details of transactions or accounts of the company, unless 
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ordered to make disclosures by a director, a court or a person to whom 
the matter in question related. Outsiders were not “entitled to acquire 
discovery of any information respecting any detail of the Company’s 
trading or any matter which is or may be in the nature of a trade secret, 
mystery of trade or secret process which may relate to the conduct of 
the business of the Company.” 
The Performing Right Society loomed large in APRA’s thinking and 
activities. Under a contract executed on 11 January 1926, the two 
societies agreed that the PRS would nominate one member of APRA’s 
board. APRA would furnish the PRS with details of performances of 
works and collections made for those performances, and, most 
significantly, pay the PRS 40 per cent of its net revenue (from sources 
other than broadcasting) after deducting expenses. In 1926 APRA 
claimed to control a repertoire of approximately two million works 
belonging to 16,000 members.  
APRA begins collecting 
On 1 July 1925, prior to incorporation, APRA began announcing, in 
Australian newspapers, its intention to collect performance fees from 
theatres, music halls, picture theatres, cabarets, dancing halls, 
restaurants and “all places of amusement or otherwise where music is 
publicly performed.” It proposed to follow the pattern of the PRS 
which for over a decade had successfully collected licence fees from 
“places of amusement” and, more recently, the BBC.  
APRA’s announcements now began a long period of dispute with the 
suppliers of public entertainment that led to (though did not end with) 
the Royal Commission on Performing Rights held between 1932 and 
1933. Over a decade, as radio broadcasting created a new culture of 
information and entertainment, APRA fought, on multiple fronts, a 
public and successful battle for copyright remuneration. It faced three 
opponents – the owners of public entertainment venues, radio stations 
and, to a smaller degree, record manufacturers. It also grappled, less 
successfully, with government.  
Battling with the commercial users of musical works, APRA enjoyed a 
decisive advantage. Copyright legislation unambiguously conferred on 
the copyright owner the right to control the public performance of 
works, a fact recognised in 1925 by a unanimous decision of the 
Victorian Supreme Court in Chappell & Co Ltd v Associated Radio Co 
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Ltd.8 In that case, the plaintiff’s counsel, John Latham,9 persuaded three 
judges that the unauthorised broadcasting of music infringed the music 
publisher’s copyright.  
At no stage, however, did APRA win easy victories. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, local government officials, entertainment entrepreneurs, 
and the representatives of the broadcasters and record manufacturers 
agreed that law conferred on the owner of musical copyright the right 
to control the public performance of copyright music. Yet many of 
these individuals, especially the local government associations that 
controlled public halls, opposed the claims of APRA with visceral 
intensity. They viewed APRA as a thief, an impostor, trying to reap 
where it did not sow.  
Concerns about APRA  
APRA’s insistence that it licensed, on behalf of owners, at least 90 per 
cent of all copyright musical works cut little ice. As the Cinematograph 
Exhibitors’ Association explained plaintively in a letter to the 
Postmaster General in May 1932 – a few months before the 
announcement of the Royal Commission – “[i]t has been one continual 
conflict since 1925.”10 APRA’s opponents declared that its claims 
emerged as if from mist: no-one could say whether the licence fees 
claimed justly remunerated copyright owners, since APRA refused to 
disclose details of its distributions or the rationale for the quantum  
of fees. 
APRA’s status as a non-profit organisation intended to disburse monies 
collected to copyright owners made little difference to its opponents. 
The Association’s aggressive assertion of the performance right, its 
seemingly arbitrary scale of fees, and its unwillingness to disclose details 
of the repertoire of works it claimed to control, or the copyright 
owners for whom fees were said to be collected, caused outrage. 
                                                     
8 Chappell & Co Ltd v Associated Radio Company Ltd (1925) VLR 350. 
9 Federal Attorney General for most of the decade 1925–1935 – the decade of the 
APRA wars. 
10 “A gun was held to the head of the whole of the Entrepreneurs by the 
Australasian Performing Right Association and we were practically forced to come 
to an arrangement which even then [1926 and 1928] was considered extortionate 
and unfair.” 
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Successive governments from different sides of politics shared the 
concern about APRA’s secretiveness and its methods. Latham, the 
Attorney General between 1925 and 1929, and 1932 and 1935, 
consistently supported the right of APRA to collect licence fees on 
behalf of its members. But in April 1926, he expressed concern, in a 
memorandum to the Solicitor General, about the rates levied by the 
Association, and raised the possibility of amending the Copyright Act 
unless APRA was “prepared to reduce its proposed charges”.  
He also disliked the tone of APRA’s correspondence. In 1927, after 
reading an APRA letter that referred disparagingly to music hall 
owners, he told the Secretary of his Department, Robert Garran, to 
inform APRA of his displeasure. If APRA’s letter reflected the usual 
tone of its correspondence, then, wrote Garran, the Attorney 
considered, “it is not a matter for surprise that the activities of the 
Association have aroused widespread antagonism.” 
As they must under the law, the Government and bureaucracy 
consistently upheld APRA’s legal right to collect licence fees on behalf 
of authors and composers. On 5 June 1926, after the first year of 
controversy surrounding APRA’s activities, the Melbourne Argus 
quoted comments made by G S Brown, the Registrar of Copyrights, in 
response to complaints against APRA. “If the public were fully 
informed,” he said, “as to the position of concerning copyright, it is 
probable that the demands of the Performing Rights Association would 
be regarded not only philosophically but as reasonable and just.” 
APRA, said Brown, “is not attempting exploitation but is only asking 
for its just and legitimate right.” 
The themes emerging in APRA’s first decade of operation still inform 
modern copyright politics. Then, as now, opponents of collective rights 
administration reproved the collecting society for refusing to name 
collection beneficiaries or disclose details of the amounts distributed. 
As now, they also pointed to the unreality of determining licence fees 
without reference to meaningful criteria for establishing the value of 
copyright works, or distinguishing, in less than an arbitrary way, 
between works of different complexity, quality or popularity.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the proponents of collective rights 
administration also defended the system with arguments heard today. 
Without collective action, they said, individual authors would be unable 
to negotiate, or collect, fees for the widespread use of their works. The 
work of collecting societies like APRA thus allowed copyright owners 
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who lacked the necessary resources to enforce their performing rights. 
In short, the collecting society interposed by necessity on behalf of 
owners to secure licence fees. 
Licence fees 
In the years 1927–1933, the period separating the royal commission 
reports on wireless and performing rights, APRA penetrated the 
popular consciousness, becoming perhaps the most unpopular 
corporate entity in Australian commercial life. Yet despite the grumbles 
and hostility, demands for payment rarely met outright refusal. The 
users of commercial music argued about APRA’s methods, and the size 
of its levies, but they accepted their legal obligation to pay a fee to 
exercise the musical performing right. They would not, however, accept 
that APRA was entitled to independently determine a scale of fees and 
then insist upon payment of those fees. 
Government officials agreed. In 1928, Sir Robert Garran reassured the 
Managing Director of Union Theatres in Sydney of Latham’s view that 
APRA “clearly has no right to “demand” a yearly toll from anybody.” 
APRA could, however, prosecute or prevent unlicensed performances, 
and it could withhold consent to performances if the party wishing to 
exercise the performance right refused to pay the licence fee demanded. 
APRA, said Garran, had “the right to take proceedings against persons 
who perform without licence any work in which it owns the 
performing right; and also to name its price for granting a licence to 
perform any or all such works.” 
In short, APRA could not compel payment of fees but it could prevent 
public performances and make payment a condition of performance. 
Pointing the way directly ahead to the 1932 Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights, Garran observed to his correspondent that  
the “force of your complaint against the Performing Rights Association 
[about APRA’s licence fees] depends very largely on the reasonableness 
or otherwise of the terms for which they offer for licences”.  
From 1926 onwards, however, arguments about reasonableness did  
not stop APRA from drawing money into its coffers in increasing 
annual increments. 
When in 1929 Latham requested APRA to supply revenue figure for 
the two preceding financial years, the Association reported annual 
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revenue in 1927 of £28,466 increasing to £40,608 in 1928.11 A Class 
radio stations contributed the vast bulk of these sums, which were 
deducted from radio set licence fee revenues allocated by government. 
In 1927, the A Class stations paid fees to APRA totalling over £15,000 
and the following year their total contribution exceeded £26,000.  
By contrast, in 1927 and 1928 respectively, the B Class stations, unable 
to rely on the revenue from the listeners’ licence fees, paid the relatively 
trifling sums of £99 and £259. In the same years, picture theatres paid 
APRA nearly £9000 and over £9,500 respectively. Hotels, restaurants 
and cafes contributed £867 and £938 respectively, dance halls £841 
and £1,169, and public halls over £2,000 and £2,500. 
APRA also placed its balance sheets before the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights. It reported receipts from the A Class stations, in 
1929, 1930 and 1931, totalling £33,022, £28, 775 and £28, 843. In the 
same years, the B Class stations paid £536, £1,887 and £2,506. The 
other users contributed aggregate totals of £13,890, £14,579  
and £18,562. 
APRA’s receipts from A Class stations fell in 1930 and 1931, though 
the total amounts collected from the other user categories continued to 
rise at an average annual compound rate above 40 per cent. The fall in 
payments from APRA’s major fee contributors is attributable to the 
effect of the Great Depression: an economically straitened public 
stopped buying new radio sets, and many listeners could not afford to 
renew their listeners’ licences. As a result, APRA drew fees from a 
reduced total of allocated revenue, and its gross takings declined. 
The Depression, however, only interrupted the upward trend in 
APRA’s takings from the radio stations. In 1939, the Postmaster 
General reported that in the previous financial year, APRA collected a 
total of £60,000 from all radio broadcasters. The Australian 
Broadcasting Commission contributed £44,000 of this sum and the 
commercial radio stations the remaining £16,000. 
                                                     
11 Although comparisons of the value of money between eras can only be highly 
approximate, the website MeasuringWorth.com calculates, by reference to GDP, 
that UK£40,000 in 1926 equalled UK£11.2 million in 2005. Britain and Australia 
returned to the gold standard in 1926 and the Australian pound was fixed in value 
to the pound sterling (the return to the gold standard caused deflation, a factor in 
determining the value of money in 1926). In 1931, the Labor Government devalued 
the Australian pound against sterling by 25 per cent to combat inflation. UK£1 
bought AUS£1 5s.  
 
130 
Collecting strategy 
The pattern of APRA’s fee takings in the first several years of its 
existence reveal a coolly premeditated strategy. In the first year of 
collecting, revenue from the A Class stations exceeded that from all 
other sources by a factor of nearly four, and though the margin 
narrowed considerably in succeeding years, the increasing size of 
receipts from the government-funded broadcasters showed clearly the 
focus of APRA’s attention. 
In the late 1920s, APRA spent considerable energy battling the 
representatives of picture theatres and public halls to secure licence 
agreements that delivered lucrative returns into the 1930s. Yet, except 
in the acute period of economic depression, these sources of income 
rarely supplied more than half the amount of revenue delivered by the 
A Class stations. In 1929, when A Class stations paid APRA £33,022, 
gross revenue from all non-broadcasting sources was £13,890 – a 
handsome sum, but one that predicted APRA would in future devote 
most of its efforts to maximising returns from broadcasters. 
Although APRA began operations in the early days of radio 
broadcasting, at a time when the government-funded and commercial 
stations struggled to break even, in the mid 1920s the bright economic 
prospects of radio stations were already visible to most observers. 
When APRA announced its collecting intentions in July 1925, 
broadcasting fever had swept the nation for year, and the new medium 
promised to attract a rapidly multiplying audience of new listeners every 
year. During the year, 66,000 listeners paid for radio licences and that 
figure doubled in 1926, increasing more than sixfold by 1932, when the 
Royal Commission on Performing Rights began its investigations. 
The Royal Commission found that in 1931, Australian radio stations 
broadcast about one million musical items, compared with about 
180,000 broadcast in Britain. The extraordinary depth and diversity of 
Australian broadcasting did not mean that Australian stations played 
more copyright or popular music – the PRS collected more than  
double APRA’s annual takings – but it demonstrated the profound 
underlying demand across the continent for communication and 
exchange of information.  
APRA knew in 1925 that this demand would guarantee the longevity of 
the new medium and supply rich dividends into the indefinite future. It 
took a decade before the Association began to extract significant 
revenue from the commercial radio stations but in the meantime it 
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realised that the financing of A Class stations through allocations of 
listeners’ fees promised to create a river of gold. When APRA began its 
operations, a single listener paid a little over one pound for a radio 
licence, and the rapidly multiplying number of licences delivered certain 
funding to the government-funded stations. Secure financing of the A 
Class stations seemed like a surety of continued copyright payments to 
the collecting society. 
APRA did not neglect its other sources of revenue. The copyright 
history of the 1920s is as much about APRA’s commercial struggle with 
the picture theatre owners and the associations controlling public halls 
as it is about disputes with broadcasters. In the 1930s, the field of 
conflict is less crowded and the primary copyright dispute of 
importance is that between APRA and the broadcasters over 
performing right licensing fees. 
The Commonwealth Radio Conference 1926 
Taking its cue from the PRS, APRA in 1926 wasted no time in 
demanding performance fees from the fledgling Australian radio 
industry. The new radio stations could not dispute APRA’s right to 
exact licence fees – Regulation 74 of the Wireless Telegraphy Regulations 
prohibited licensed broadcasters from transmitting copyright works 
without the consent of owners – but they were outraged by the fees 
proposed. The broadcasters’ resentment simmered for a year and finally 
boiled over in a two day conference organised by the Association for 
the Development of Wireless in Australia and held in May 1926.  
The ADWA’s “Commonwealth Radio Conference” made two 
resolutions: to ask the Commonwealth government to appoint a royal 
commission to investigate wireless in Australia, and to place before the 
royal commission “special reports covering Copyright, Patents, Licence 
Fees, Education and Scientific Research”. The Conference report 
acknowledged the right of copyright owners to receive remuneration 
for the public performance of copyright material but criticised APRA 
for greed and aggression. 
The wireless stations agreed on five key points. The first two continue 
to be raised in a variety of ways in modern copyright discussions. 
According to the ADWA, the original copyright legislators never 
contemplated that the principles they espoused would be extended to a 
technology of which they had no knowledge, and APRA had no basis 
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for assuming that these legislators would have intended that copyright 
owners could claim a performance fee for radio broadcasting.  
The last three points concerned the absolute nature of the performance 
right: the radio stations were aggrieved that “copyright claimants” could 
“demand any royalty they think fit” and, by withholding permission to 
perform copyright works, “withdraw the latest music”. Finally, they 
noted, because APRA demanded what they called extortionate 
performance fees, stations could only afford to play a limited repertoire 
of works: APRA’s greed worked to “deprive the public of radio 
programmes they are just entitled to.” 
Without doubt, the catalogue of APRA wrongs listed in by the ADWA 
in the conference report would have impressed the government 
audience to whom it was directed. According to the ADWA, in the 
previous year APRA had, among other things, claimed up to 21 per 
cent of the broadcasters’ net revenue in licence fees, withdrawn consent 
for the playing of popular works, prevented the broadcast of more than 
two numbers from an opera in a single radio program, restricted to four 
the number of times per week that popular items could be played, 
claimed twice for the same performance and claimed fees for the 
performance of works out of copyright. 
The ADWA report inspired swift official action on behalf of the A 
Class stations. The Government called a conference that met on 23 July 
1926 to discuss the national stations’ copyright broadcasting fees and a 
second conference in August. Percy Deane, Secretary of the Prime 
Minister’s Department, agreed for APRA to receive 10 per cent of 
station revenue drawn from fees for the first 100,000 listeners’ licences 
issued in Australia. APRA would receive 5 per cent of revenue allocated 
for any further licences issued.  
The position of the B Class stations, however, remained unsettled. 
APRA concentrated its efforts on those stations that in 1926 received 
income from advertising. In the case of one station, APRA began by 
demanding payment of 3s 6d per copyright item broadcast and 
gradually reduced the claim to less than one tenth of the original claim.  
The Royal Commission on Wireless 1927 
Perplexed by the problems arising in connection with the performing 
right, the Government included the investigation of broadcast 
copyright in the terms of reference of the its inquiry into the wireless 
industry. The Royal Commission on Wireless began its inquiry in 
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January 1927, reporting ten months later. The Royal Commission’s 
report noted reprovingly that APRA already wished to change the 
terms of the A Class station payment arrangements agreed with Percy 
Deane a year before. APRA proposed that it should now receive 7.5 
per cent of total revenue received for listeners’ licence fees, irrespective 
of the number of licences issued.  
The report went on to state that APRA’s licence fees were “in our 
opinion, out of proportion to the service rendered, or value given by 
the Association, or the author whom they represent, and is an 
advantage that in the majority of instances was never contemplated as 
likely to belong to either the author or composer or the assignee of the 
copyright.” The report also observed that, according to “the latest 
figures in our possession relating to the practice in England the 
proportion of total revenue paid by broadcasting stations in Australia is 
more than double that paid in the former country.” 
The Commissioners concluded that copyright owners “derive 
considerable benefit from the broadcasting of their works, and the 
publicity so given broadly counterbalances any loss on sales of sheet 
music.” They explicitly declined, however, to debate the merits of the 
performing right. As their report said, though “the validity of copyright 
as applied to broadcasting has been questioned in evidence tendered to 
this Commission, we deem such questions outside the terms of 
reference … and have therefore assumed its validity.”  
They instead recommended that the compulsory licensing provisions of 
section 19 of the British Copyright Act 1911 be applied to broadcast 
copyright. Under the scheme they envisaged, the radio stations could 
play the full repertoire of music controlled by APRA but would be 
liable to pay royalties to the owners of copyright. Importantly, the 
report also recommended that Australia should advocate, at the 1928 
Rome Conference to revise the Berne Convention, amendment of the 
Convention to permit members to limit the amount of royalty payable 
by broadcasters.  
The Commission proposed a limit on licence fees in Australia of, in the 
case of A Class stations, 5 per cent of annual revenue (or fourpence per 
performance), and in the case of B Class stations, fourpence per 
performance of musical works.12 The Commissioners did not make 
                                                     
12 At the Rome Conference, Australia and New Zealand (supported especially by 
Canada) would argue strongly, and successfully, for allowance for restriction on the 
newly recognised right of copyright owners to control copyright broadcasts. 
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clear whether they intended that the radio stations should be permitted 
to negotiate royalty rates lower than those specified in the Report. They 
probably intended the figures to be taken as fixed rates and hoped that 
their proposal would eliminate fractiousness and bring certainty to an 
unsettled industry.13  
Government officials were not persuaded. Their disquiet, aired 
privately in 1926, illustrates how, for government, the matter of 
regulating the performing right swiftly became an intractable problem. 
The Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department felt so concerned 
that in May 1926, he asked the Commissioners for an interim report, 
even though they had not finished hearing evidence. The four royal 
commissioners would not furnish a report but they supplied a summary 
setting out their intended proposals on broadcast copyright policy. 
Preliminary government views 
After looking at a draft summary of the Commissioners’ 
recommendations, the Attorney General’s Department prepared a 
memorandum pointing out the difficulty of government fixing the fees 
payable for the public performance of music. The memorandum 
declared it “out of the question” that “the [Berne] Convention should 
attempt to lay down a scale of royalties and prescribe their 
distribution.” Next, it criticised the Commission’s reference to the 
principles set out in section 19 of the British Copyright Act, “which 
provides for copyright in material records”. The Commissioners were, 
by referring to section 19, trying to propose a system of compulsory 
licensing with caps placed upon the amount of royalty claimable. 
However, according to the Attorney General’s Department, there “is 
little analogy between the two cases” and “the only principle intended 
to applied is that of a royalty fixed on an arbitrary basis.”  
The memorandum is worth re-examining chiefly because it canvassed 
two objections that were raised repeatedly in the next decade of  
public debate over the performing right. They go to the heart of  
the practical difficulties raised by the administration of collective  
rights – the problems of distributing performance fees to copyright  
 
                                                     
13 Time showed their proposal to be unrealistic. In 1933, the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights reported that the “royalty suggested [by the Royal Commission 
on Wireless] was found to be impracticable and it has not been suggested to the 
present Commission that such a basis should be adopted.” 
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holders and determining rates of remuneration. The author of the 
memorandum adopted a pessimistic position on each of these 
questions. The memorandum declared that “the basis of royalty 
suggested is impracticable.”  
The alternatives of 5 per cent of gross annual revenue (in the case of A 
Class stations) or, at the election of the copyright owner, fourpence per 
performance, were “irreconcilable” because “if some copyright owners 
select the second, the first is thrown out of adjustment, because the 
percentage is clearly intended to satisfy the claims of all copyright 
owners.” The writer declared that distribution by APRA (“a private 
association, which claims to represent the bulk of copyright owners, 
but certainly does not represent them all”) of bulk royalties collected 
under the percentage system was “obviously impossible”. 
In the case of the proposed remuneration system based on fee-per-
performance, the fixed fee of 4d per performance was “unsatisfactory, 
even as an alternative.” A flat fee did not allow for discrimination 
between works that varied in complexity and length. “A whole opera or 
oratorio, or a symphony in five movements, is placed on a level with a 
fox-trot or a morceau of a few bars.” Equally, the percentage system 
failed to allow for differences in the relative popularity of songs, nor 
the different artistic quality of pieces of music. The writer asked – in 
unfortunate language – “who is to assess the dividends, say, for 
Rosenkavalier and a coon song?” 
The memorandum seemingly favoured market determination of 
performing right fees, though the author did not discuss the fact  
that the public performance right loaded the market in the  
copyright holder’s favour. The memorandum stated that “it is open to 
doubt whether sufficient reason has been shown for not allowing a 
composer to market his work at his own price.” But it offered no 
solution to the problem of APRA imposing unreasonable licensing 
terms on a captive market.  
Perhaps because APRA had been active for a mere 12 months, the 
author wrote condescendingly about the strength of its negotiating 
position and the concerns about oppression expressed by the radio 
stations. APRA was “one particular Association.” A “reasonable 
solution” was “not likely to be reached except after thorough inquiry”. 
But the memorandum supplied no detail about the “reasonable 
solution”. The reason for silence was no doubt that government, and  
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probably the Royal Commissioners, were flummoxed by the sudden 
appearance of APRA, and the seemingly vast scope of difficulties raised 
by its active enforcement of the performing right. 
